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Introduction 
Rising Medicare costs have been a major contributor 
to projected long-run budget deficits, and rising out-
of-pocket costs have become an increasing challenge 
to individuals’ retirement security.  The 2010 Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) made 
substantial changes to Medicare, designed both to im-
prove the program’s finances and to reduce the out-
of-pocket costs faced by retirees.  However, the Office 
of the Actuary (OACT) at the Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services (CMS) warns that the assumed 
impact of the ACA may be overly optimistic and that 
realized savings may be far more muted.  As a result, 
since 2010, OACT each year has released a set of alter-
native projections to illustrate Medicare expenditures 
if current-law payment reductions are not sustained.  
This brief compares the baseline projections in the an-
nual Medicare Trustees Report with OACT’s alternative 
projections. 
The discussion proceeds as follows.  The first 
section discusses the ACA changes and the projected 
decline in Medicare expenditures.  The second section 
examines how the reductions in expenditures trans-
late into lower out-of-pocket spending for beneficia-
ries.  The third section outlines the key differences 
in assumptions between the Medicare Trustees Report 
and OACT’s alternative projections.  The fourth sec-
tion examines how the two sets of projections have 
changed over time.  The conclusion is that they have 
been converging, suggesting increasing agreement 
that the ACA will significantly reduce long-run Medi-
care costs. 
The ACA’s Impact on 
Medicare Spending, Taxes, 
and Premiums
Medicare is composed of two programs.  The Hospi-
tal Insurance (HI) program, Part A, covers inpatient 
hospital services, skilled nursing facilities, home 
health care, and hospice care.  HI is financed by a 2.9 
percent payroll tax, shared equally by employers and 
employees.  The Supplementary Medical Insurance 
(SMI) program consists of two separate accounts: Part 
B, which covers physician and outpatient hospital 
services, and Part D, which was enacted in 2003 and 
covers prescription drugs.  About 75 percent of the 
costs of Parts B and D are paid from the government’s 
general revenues, which come from the personal 
income tax, corporate income tax, etc.  The other 25 
percent is paid from monthly premiums charged to 
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On the tax side, the ACA increased HI trust fund 
revenues with a 0.9-percent payroll tax on individual 
earnings of more than $200,000 ($250,000 for mar-
ried couples).  These thresholds are not indexed for 
price or wage increases so that, over time, a growing 
proportion of workers will become subject to the ad-
ditional 0.9-percent tax.4
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Figure 1. Projected Medicare Spending as 
Percentage of GDP in 2015, 2035, 2080 from the 
2009 and 2015 Trustees’ Reports
Sources: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2009 
and 2015).
beneficiaries, which typically are deducted from Social 
Security benefits before they are sent to the recipient.1 
In addition to monthly premiums, beneficiaries are 
also responsible for covering co-payments and other 
out-of-pocket health care expenses.    
In 2010, Congress passed the ACA, which con-
tained roughly 165 provisions aimed at reducing 
costs, increasing revenues, eliminating fraud and 
waste, and developing research and technological 
enhancements in the Medicare program.2  Since the 
enactment of these far-reaching changes, the official 
cost projections in the Trustees Report have declined 
dramatically as a percentage of GDP.  Between the 
2009 and 2015 Reports, projected costs as a percentage 
of GDP for 2035 dropped from 7.2 percent to 5.4 per-
cent and, for 2080, from 11.2 percent to 6.0 percent 
(see Figure 1).3  
In addition to reducing total expenditures, the 
ACA also increased taxes and premiums for high-
income Medicare beneficiaries.  Income-related pre-
miums were first introduced for Part B in 2007, but 
the ACA froze the income thresholds at 2010 levels 
through 2019 and extended income testing to Part D 
premiums (see Box).  The Medicare Access and CHIP 
Reauthorization Act of 2015 further increased premi-
ums for those with the highest incomes.  
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Box: Income-Related  
Medicare Premiums
Income-related SMI premiums were first es-
tablished in the Medicare Modernization Act of 
2003.  These means-tested premiums required 
higher-income individuals to pay a greater portion 
of per capita Part B costs.  The ACA applied the 
same income-related premium thresholds to Part 
D premiums and froze the income thresholds at 
2010 levels through 2019.  As a result, growth in 
incomes will push a larger share of beneficiaries 
above these static thresholds.  The Medicare Access 
and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (discussed 
below) contains further provisions that will in-
crease the share of beneficiaries who fall into the 
higher premium brackets, effective 2018.  The table 
below shows these income thresholds for SMI 
premium brackets. 
Table. Income Thresholds for SMI Premiums 
in 2015 and 2018, by Marital Status 
Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2015).
< $85,000 < $170,000 25 25
85,000-107,000 170,000-267,000 35 35
107,000-133,500 214,000-267,000 50 50
133,500-160,000 267,000-320,000 50 65
160,000-214,000 320,000-428,000 65 80
> 214,000 > 428,000 80 80
Single Married
2015 2018
Percentage of 
per capita 
SMI costs
% %
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Going forward, the additional 0.9-percent tax is 
projected to boost payroll tax revenues relative to GDP 
(see Figure 2).  Even growing revenues, however, will 
not be sufficient to cover HI outlays, and the deficit 
remains a steady percentage of GDP as shown at the 
top of the figure.  In contrast to HI, by law SMI is 
fully funded through premiums and general rev-
enues.  Because SMI revenues increase at the same 
rate as expenditures, the premiums and general rev-
enue transfers will increase relative to GDP.  Growth 
in general revenue financing as a share of GDP puts 
pressure on the federal budget, and rising SMI premi-
ums place a growing burden on beneficiaries.  
In 2014, the average beneficiary spent 23 percent 
of his Social Security benefit on out-of-pocket Medi-
care costs – 3 percentage points less than the histori-
cal peak of 26 percent in 2011.  According to the 2015 
official projections, this ratio will increase slowly but 
remain well below 40 percent, instead of approaching 
70 percent as in the pre-ACA projection. 
 
Alternative Medicare  
Projections
This story all seems to be great news.  The ACA has, 
either directly or indirectly, helped to reduce long-
run aggregate and per capita health cost projections.  
However, long-range projections are highly sensitive 
to the chosen assumptions, and critics are uncertain 
about the sustainability of Medicare payment reduc-
tions in the future. 
Beginning in 2010, in the Statement of Actuarial 
Opinion that concludes the annual Medicare Trustees 
Report, OACT has stated that actual costs are likely 
to exceed the projections shown in the Report.  To 
promote awareness, OACT releases an accompany-
ing set of alternative projections to illustrate Medicare 
expenditures if payment reductions under the ACA 
are not sustained.  The 2015 Trustees Report projec-
tions are further complicated by provisions in the 
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 
2015 (MACRA).    
Figure 2. Medicare Spending and Sources of Non-
Interest Income, as Percentage of GDP, 1970-2088
Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2015).
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Medicare Out-of-Pocket 
Spending
The decline in Medicare expenditure growth means 
that retirees will, relative to pre-ACA projections, 
spend a smaller percentage of their Social Security 
benefit on out-of-pocket Medicare costs and, as a 
result, have more disposable income for non-health-
care expenditures.  Projections of out-of-pocket health 
expenses as a percentage of the average Social Secu-
rity benefit have declined sharply from 2009 – before 
the ACA – to 2010 – immediately after ACA passage 
– to 2015 (see Figure 3).  
Total expenditures
HI deficit
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Figure 3. SMI Out-Of-Pocket (OOP) Expenses as 
Percentage of Average Social Security Benefit in 
2014 Dollars, 2009, 2010, 2015
Sources: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2009, 
2010, and 2015).
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The major reasons for the difference between the 
Trustees Report projections and OACT’s alternative 
projections fall under three headings: 1) payments to 
physicians; 2) productivity assumptions; and 3) the 
Independent Payment Advisory Board.
Physician Payments
In April 2015, Congress passed the MACRA, which 
repealed the Medicare ‘Doc Fix’ law and prevented a 
21-percent cut in Medicare physician rates.  The ‘Doc 
Fix’ woes arose from the Sustainable Growth Rate 
(SGR) reimbursement formula in the 1997 Balanced 
Budget Act.  The SGR set target levels for Medicare ex-
penditures.  If physicians did not exceed these targets, 
they would receive modest pay increases.  If they did 
exceed the targets, their reimbursement rates would 
be cut.  In fact, physicians continuously exceeded the 
targets, but every year Congress postponed the cuts 
in their payments.  By 2015, physicians were facing a 
21-percent cut, an implausible number since physi-
cians would just cease to accept Medicare patients. 
The MACRA replaces the SGR with a new pay-
ment system that eliminates the need for annual 
legislative overrides.  A key feature of the new system, 
which will be phased in gradually, is an emphasis 
on measuring and rewarding the quality, rather than 
quantity, of health care services.  From 2016-2019, 
physician payments will increase by 0.5 percent an-
nually.  Beginning in 2019, in addition to this base-
line payment increase, physicians will be eligible to 
receive incentive payments under one of two tracks: 
the Alternative Payment Model (APM) or the Merit-
Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS).5  From 
2020-2025, baseline payment levels will be frozen at 
the 2019 level.  Beginning in 2026, physicians in the 
APM track will receive a 0.75-percent annual increase 
while those in the MIPS track will receive a 0.25-per-
cent increase.  
While the MACRA avoids the significant short-run 
payment issues that arose under the SGR approach, 
it does raise long-run concerns.  Specifically, the 
payment rates are not expected to keep pace with the 
increase in physician costs, and the payment rates un-
der the MACRA will be below what they would have 
been under the SGR by 2048.  The result is that Medi-
care payment rates will fall far below private health in-
surance payment rates from about 80 percent today to 
about 25 percent (see Figure 4).  If physician compen-
sation lags significantly, access to Medicare physicians 
could become a serious problem, which would likely 
result in significant pressure to raise the rates.   
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Source: Shatto and Clemens (2015).
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Productivity Adjustments
Similar to physicians, the other services covered 
by the Medicare fee-for-service program (including 
inpatient and outpatient hospital services) also receive 
annual payment increases.  The ACA introduced 
cost-saving measures that would reduce these annual 
increases by the percentage increase in the 10-year 
moving average of economy-wide productivity.6  The 
goal was to create strong incentives for providers to 
improve efficiency.  In the 2015 Trustees Report, pro-
ductivity is estimated to increase by 1.1 percent per 
year.  Given the labor-intensive nature of the health 
sector, measured productivity gains are expected to be 
much smaller.7  As a result, the reductions in com-
pensation will exceed productivity gains and cut into 
providers’ earnings.  Eventually, Medicare payment 
rates for inpatient hospital services would fall from 
about 60 percent of the average level for private insur-
ance today to below 40 percent (see Figure 5 on the 
next page).  
Figure 4. Medicare and Private Insurance 
Payments for Physician Services under Current 
Law, 2000-2085
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Independent Payment Advisory Board
In addition to reductions in physician and provider 
payment updates, the Independent Payment Advisory 
Board – which has not yet been established – is sup-
posed to propose reductions in Medicare spending if 
cost growth surpasses GDP growth by more than 1.0 
percentage point.8  These proposals would automati-
cally take effect in the absence of a legislative override.
Alternative Estimates
Given that future Medicare payments are likely to 
be inadequate, OACT developed alternative projec-
tions for Medicare Parts A and B.  The alternative 
assumes that: 1) starting in 2024, physician payments 
transition from a period of no increase in the Medi-
cal Expenditure Index to an increase of 2.3 percent 
by 2039; and 2) starting in 2020, the economy-wide 
productivity adjustments gradually phase down to 0.4 
percent until the Medicare price updates equal those 
assumed for private health plans in 2034.  In addition, 
the projections assume that the Independent Payment 
Advisory Board requirements will not be implement-
ed.  On average, under this alternative, the long-range 
per beneficiary growth rate for all Medicare services 
would be similar to the long-range growth rate 
assumed for the overall health sector.  Not surpris-
ingly, the alternative assumptions show a substantial 
increase in expenditures as a percent of GDP for both 
Medicare Part A and Part B (see Table 1). 
Source: Shatto and Clemens (2015).
Table 1. 2015 Projections of Medicare Part A and 
Part B Spending as Percentage of GDP, Trustees 
Report and OACT Alternative in Selected Years
Source: Shatto and Clemens (2015).
2020 1.53 1.53 1.71 1.71
2040 2.13 2.38 2.51 2.79
2060 2.15 2.81 2.44 3.23
2080 2.23 3.40 2.43 3.79
Year
Part A Part B
Trustees TrusteesAlternative Alternative
A Longer Perspective
With six years of Trustees’ and alternative projections 
available for comparison, an interesting question is 
whether the projections are converging or diverging 
over time and whether the changes are coming from 
the Trustees’ estimates or from OACT’s alternative 
scenarios.  Figure 6, which shows projected costs as a 
percentage of GDP for the last six years, indicates that 
the gap between the Trustees’ projections and OACT’s 
Figure 6. Projected Medicare Spending as  
Percentage of GDP from 2010-2015 Trustees 
Report and OACT Alternative, 2009-2080 
Source: Shatto and Clemens (2010-2015).
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Figure 5. Medicare and Private Insurance 
Payments for Inpatient Hosptial Services under 
Current Law, 2000-2085
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alternative projections is narrowing.  Interestingly, this 
narrowing is the result of OACT’s alternative projec-
tions decreasing, while the Trustees’ projections have 
held relatively steady.
The same narrowing of estimates can be seen by 
looking at the projected deficit in the HI trust fund.  
In 2015, the 75-year deficit in the alternative scenario 
exceeded the Trustees’ deficit by 1.02 percentage 
points, which – while significant – was the smallest 
difference in the six-year period (see Figure 7).     
Conclusion
Since the ACA’s enactment, Medicare expenditure 
projections have dropped significantly, which will 
mean relatively lower out-of-pocket health costs for 
current and future retirees.  However, this sense of 
progress must be moderated by the uncertainty in-
volved in long-range projections.  The substantial gap 
in cost rates that still remains between the Medicare 
Trustees’ projections and OACT’s alternative projec-
tions underscores the continued uncertainty about 
future Medicare costs.
Figure 7. Percentage-Point Difference in 75-Year 
Deficit of HI Trust Fund between OACT 
Alternative and Trustees’ Projections, 2010-2015
Source: Authors’ calculations from Shatto and Clemens 
(2010-2015).
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Endnotes
1  Part D enrollees may elect to waive this deduction 
and pay their premiums via other mechanisms.
2  The main provisions for restraining cost growth 
include reducing provider payment updates – partly 
due to assumed improvements in productivity – and 
aligning payments for Medicare Advantage plans with 
payments under traditional Medicare
3  Under both pre- and post-ACA projections, total 
Medicare expenditures increase at a faster pace than 
both aggregate workers’ earnings and the overall 
economy due to: 1) the number of beneficiaries 
increasing more rapidly than the number of workers; 
and 2) the growth in beneficiary expenditures exceed-
ing the growth in per capita GDP.
4  The ACA also specifies that individuals with 
incomes above $200,000 per year and couples above 
$250,000 pay an additional Medicare contribution of 
3.8 percent on some or all of their non-work income 
(such as investment earnings).  However, the rev-
enues from this tax are not allocated to the Medicare 
trust funds.  
5  Incentive payments under the APM apply only 
through 2025, while the separate incentive payments 
under the MIPS continue.  For more details on the 
new payment system and the two separate tracks, see 
Bloniarz and Glass (2015).
6  Payment updates are normally indexed to statu-
tory input price indices.  These price indices are 
determined by measuring the increase in the prices 
of goods and services a provider must pay to provide 
care for their patients.
7  In recent years, hospital productivity averaged 
around 0.4 percent per year.  Skilled nursing facilities 
experienced close to zero annual productivity gains. 
8  From 2013-2017, the per-capita Medicare spend-
ing growth rate threshold is set to the averages of 
the increase in the Consumer Price Index for All 
Urban Consumers (CPI-U) and the Average Medical 
Care Expenditure category of the CPI-U.  After 2017, 
Independent Payment Advisory Board proposals are 
required.
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